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STUDENT NOTES
party would be estopped by the record to maintain a second suit;
so election of remedies would be mere surplusage there. When
thus limited and qualified, election of remedies is a neutral doc-
trine. It is harmless and practically useless; but it is hard to
justify any extension of the limitation. Modern ideas of justice
are not readily reconcilable to the proposition that a plaintiff must
lose a valuable right of action merely because his ignorant or care-
less attorney has attempted to pursue a remedy that was not avail-
able to him or has bungled what should have been a sufficient rem-
edy. So long as the plaintiff is acting in good faith, the law should
not place arbitrary and unwarranted restrictions upon his honest
efforts to get what is justly due him. If the defendant actually
owes something, there is small justification for allowing him to
escape payment through some artificial doctrine. On the other
hand, if he does not owe anything, he will usually not be preju-
diced by having the case tried on its merits.
As already indicated, it seems that West Virginia has not yet
saddled herself with this so-called doctrine of election of remedies.
Limited to its proper scope, it would not have changed the .result
in Cameron v. Cameron; for, in bringing the annulment suit, the
plaintiff was merely attempting to assert a remedy she did not
have. The case, however, afforded an excellent opportunity for
the court to take a definite stand as to the application and scope
of election of remedies in West Virginia, which was not exploited.
-GEORGE W. McQuAN.
BANKRUPTCY - TRUSTEES - ATTACK BY COURTS ON CREDIT
AssocIAONS. - The Report of the New York Bankruptcy In-
vestigation, usually referred to as the Donovan Report,' wrote an
important chapter into the story of bankruptcy administration in
the United States. Boldly formulated under the auspices of the
bench and bar to meet the serious challenges issuing from pre-
fictional device to enable the plaintiff to maintain assumpsit, it seems to be
going pretty far to say that he has affirmed and is bound by a contract which
every one knows never existed. If this idea of tentative affirmance were
adopted, it would seem that a plaintiff who has procured a judgment for
damages should not be barred from other remedies, unless his judgment has
been satisfied or is capable of being satisfied.
' Issued in March, 1930, by Col. William J. Donovan (formerly Assistant
to the Attorney General), acting as counsel for the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, the New York County Lawyers' Association, and
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vious investigations and common rumor, it is at once an indict-
ment and a presentation of a constructive reform program. While
disagreement has been voiced as to some details, the broad prin-
ciples of the Report seem generally acceptable.2 In fact many of
its recommendations have been incorporated into the proposed
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act now being studied by the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
Among other matters the Donovan Report devoted much at-
tention to the trustee in bankruptcy.' The Bankruptcy Act pro-
vided that, subject to the approval of the referee or district judge,
a majority of creditors in number and in amount of provable
claims should elect such a trustee of the bankrupt estate at their
first meeting.' But at this crucial point there has been a break-
down in the theory of this democratic creditor control upon which
the whole Act is based The average bankrupt estate has been so
small and so unproductive of realized assets that creditors, es-
pecially business men, have not been eager to give their time to
active participation in the administration;' nor have the trustees
been willing to function effectively for the compensation provided
for in the Act.!
Into the picture also has come an unanticipated "lawyer con-
trol", especially in metropolitan centers. The trustee, supposedly
the actual administrator and liquidator, - under the theory upon
which the Act of 1898 was predicated - was to consult an at-
the Bronx County Bar Association, in an inquiry into the administration of
bankrupt estates conducted before Judge Thomas D. Thatcher of the District
Cour for the Southern District of New York (since appointed Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States).
2 Clark, Reform in Bankruptoyj Administration (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV.
1189 (an excellent review of the Donovan Report).
DDonovan Report (House Committee Print, 71st Cong. 3d Sess. 1931), at
13.20, 26-36, 78-91.
BA rmroy ACT § 44, 30 STAT. 557 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 72 (1926);
General Order 13 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 53 (1926). "Trustees may be
(1) individuals who are respectively competent to perform the duties of that
office, and reside or have an office in the judicial district within which they
are appointed, or (2) corporations authorized by their charters or by law to
act in such capacity and having an office in the judicial district within which
they are appointed." BNKRuPTCoY ACT § 45, 30 STAT. 557 (1898), 11 U. S.
C. A. § 73 (1926).
'The writer's statements herein are based upon the Donovan Report, supra
n. 3, at 3-5.
' For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, a survey showed an average of
$1,559 in gross assets for every bankrupt estate. Creditors recouped only
7.51 per cent on their claims. REPORT A'T'Y GF-N. (1929) 189.
7BxAm'UPT ACT §§ 48, 72, 30 Stat. 557 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 76, 112
(1926); General Order 42 (1925), 11 U. S. C. A. § 53 (1926); Donovan
Report, supra n. 3, at 1-7, 12.
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torney only upon strictly legal matters. Although usually law-
yers themselves, the trustees in fact have applied for the appoint-
ment of an attorney in almost every case. The appointee was often
the attorney for the petitioning creditors upon the theory that he
was already acquainted with the affairs of the estate. The pos-
sibility of embarrassment because of conflicting interests between
the estate and any creditors who had received preferences soon
became apparent.! Attorneys have effected improper arrange-
ments with collection agencies in splitting fees and granting favors
that they might receive information to enable them to obtain bank-
ruptcy business by filing involuntary petitions, or in voluntary
cases, a petition for the appointment of a receiver. Thus, the at-
torney for the creditors might be carried through the proceedings
as counsel for the receiver and finally for the trustee through the
solicitation of proxies. In an effort to curb such irregular and
fraudulent practices in the cities the courts have superimposed
such a complicated system of rules and regulations that the trustee
at the present time really needs an attorney to meet the technical
requirements.
In the face of these conditions it is natural that creditors
should have turned to extra-legal means of administering insolvent
estates. Reputable, efficient adjustment bureaus have arisen
(sponsored by the National Association of Credit Men) which
have met with conspicuous success in realizing larger returns
for the creditors in settlements outside of court than in bank-
ruptcy. When, therefore, one or more of the creditors persists
in seeking administration in the bankruptcy court, rather than
8 As to trustees' duties see BANxRUPTCY ACT § 47, 30 STAT, 557 (1898), 11
U. S. C. A. § 75 (1926). "Attorneys virtually controlled the administration.
They would collect the accounts receivable, arrange for the sale of assets,
arrange for the appointment of appraisers, examine the bankrupt, draw the
receivers' and trustees' reports, arrange for the payment of dividends and
generally attend to all the details of administration."1 Donovan Report, supra
n. 3, at 16. As to compensation of trustees see ibid, at 17-18, 94. "Many
abuses have occured in the bankruptcy practice, and none is more frequent
than that by which the attorney for petitioning creditors becomes counsel for
the trustees subsequently appointed. This mingling of interests, frequently
conflicting, is generally regarded by courts as working to the detriment of one
of the parties and to the undue advantage of another. Experience has shown
the wisdom and necessity of separating the function and obligation of counsel
by forbidding the employment in different interests of the same person .....
The danger of giving entire freedom of selection of counsel to the trustee lies
in the temptation of the attorney for some creditors when he becomes counsel
for the trustees to use his function as representative of all the creditors un-
justly to favor or oppose particular creditors or to induce the trustees to do
so." The late Chief Justice Taft in Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. 160, 168, 49 S.
Ct. 144, 147 (1928).
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outside of court, it is also natural that the same creditors, who
would have preferred extra-legal administration, should seek to
elect the manager of an approved adjustment bureau as trustee
in bankruptcy.' As lawyers, certain referees in bankruptcy have
sometimes been embarrassed, perhaps, in exercising their power
to pass upon such selections as encroach upon the lawyer's pre-
viously exclusive domain. But if, in the present "patched-up
system of court and lawyer control", the attorney for the trustee
really plays the dominant role and the trusteeship is only the
crust of the office as originally conceived, are such encroachments
really of much importance? On the other hand, if the trustee-
ship is to be restored to a position of active responsibility in solv-
ing a business problem,"0 should not a competent adjustment
bureau (such as those on the approved list of the National As-
sociation of Credit Men) receive proper recognition through its
manager?
The exact limitations of the referee's power to approve or
disapprove the trustee-elect are not clear. In practice it has been
wielded in various conflicting fashions. The Donovan report"
shows that, in some districts aside from any consideration of in-
tegrity, men are disapproved who are believed to be incompetent,
dilatory, careless, or who owe their election to solicitation. In
other districts mere solicitation of claims and proxy control of
trustee elections will not disqualify since that is often the only
means of preventing the estate from falling into the hands of im-
proper persons. Other referees rarely or never refuse to confirm
the selection of the creditors. Several recent cases reveal, how-
ever, what seems to be an unfortunate tendency on the part of
referees, namely, to veto the election of an adjustment bureau
manager as a trustee in bankruptcy.
In Re Leader Mercantile Company,' Vernor Hall, manager
of the North Texas Adjustment and Credit Interchange Bureau,
OBillig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea for Friendly Adjustment (1929)
14 CoRN. L. Q. 413, 426, 438. Even in bankruptcy an adjustment bureau
may be useful since its manager may (1) represent a group of creditors, or
(2) act as receiver or trustee, and may be instrumental in curbing abusive
practices so common in bankruptcy administration.
"0 This is the recommendation of the Donovan Report, supra n. 3.
"Donovan Report, supra n. 3, at 87-89.
"29 F. (2d) 570 (D. C., N. D. Tex., 1928), aff'd, 36 F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A.
5th, 1929), certiorari denied, Graham Brown Shoe Co. v. Holliday, 281 U. S.
760, 50 S. Ct. 411 (1929). Vernor Hall, the rejected trustee, was an expert
witness in the Donovan Inquiry. His position as bureau manager was the
primary reason for the veto. In re Scott, infra n. 19, at 91.
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1932], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss4/7
STUDENT NOTES
a voluntary association of local creditors specializing in the liquida-
tion of insolvent estates and on the approved list of the National
Association of Credit M/en, received a majority in number and
amount of the creditors' votes for trustee at their first meeting.
The referee immediately disapproved this selection, referring sole-
ly to Hall's activities in soliciting claims which, however, did not
reflect in any way upon his personal integrity. Hall, who appar-
ently controlled the claims of the creditors voting for him, de-
clined to take any further part in the proceedings, and when the
meeting reconvened after a ten minute adjournment, another
trustee was selected by those creditors voting. The court passed
upon the validity of the referee's veto power generally" and up-
held the referee's exercise of discretion in refusing to confirm
Hall's election upon the grounds (1) that he received a fixed sal-
ary and in the past had turned over his fees as trustee to the
bureau; (2) that he had in the past delegated some of his duties
to employees of the bureau; (3) that he had solicited proxies
which he voted for himself ;" (4) that he sought to have the bank-
rupt make a general assignment for the benefit of creditors ;' and
"The following cases always assumed the validity of this order. In re
White, 15 Fed. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Wilson v. Continental Bldg.
& Loan Assn., 232 Fed. 824 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916); In re Merritt Constn. Co.,
219 Fed. 555 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1914); Kiser v. Ga. Cotton Oil Co., 208 Fed. 548
(C. C. A. 5th, 1913); In re McGill, 106 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 5th, 1901).
"'A trustee should be free from all entangling alliances or associations.
In re Lewensohn, 98 Fed. 576 (D. C., S. D. N. Y., 1899). The decisions are
unanimous that a trustee will be disapproved whose selection was brought
about by the bankrupt or by others in the bankrupt's interest. In re Bloom-
berg, 48 Fed. (2d) 635 (D. Q. D. Minn., 1931); In re White; In ro Conti-
nental Bldg. & Loan Assn.; In re McGill, all supra n. 13. But a stockholder
and officer of a bankrupt corporation is not necessarily incompetent to act as
its trustee. In re Merritt Constn. Co., supra n. 13. Although reprehensible
like the practice of chasing hearses and ambulances, the selection of a trustee
by a majority of the creditors through solicitation of proxies will not be dis-
turbed, even though he occupied the same suite of offices with the bankrupt's
attorney where it does not appear that the selection was brought about in the
bankrupt's interest. In re Fischer, 193 Fed. 104 (D. C., M. D. Pa., 1911).
An attorney may vote unsolicited proxies but cannot vote claims coming to
him through the instrumentality of the bankrupt, and his nominee for trustee
may qualify. In re Lloyd, 148 Fed. 92 (D. C., E. D. Wis., 1906). The Dono-
van Report, supra n. 3, at 30, recommends limiting the right to solicit proxies
to creditors and permitting attorneys to represent only their regular clients.
Young, Bankruptcy Buling on Solicitation of Votes for the Trusteeship (1931)
16 M.Ass. L. Q. 12.
is Contra: I re Blue Ridge Packing Co., 125 Fed. 619 (D. C., M. D. Pa.,
1903) (One who advised voluntary assignment, which constituted act of bank-
ruptcy, may serve as trustee. The fact that he had an office with the'attorney
for certain stockholders of the bankrupt corporation whose claims as creditors
were to be contested, that these persons were his former clients and put their
claims into his associate's hands at his suggestion, and that the trustee's
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(5) that he might not be disinterested because his employer repre-
sented local creditors." The briefs indicated bitter feeling be-
tween the referee and the rejected trustee. 7
In Garrison v. Pilliod Cabinet Co.' the executive manager of
the Wichita Association of Credit Men had already obtained a
trust mortgage, in effect a common law assignment, of the assets
of the estate subsequently thrown into bankruptcy. Despite the
successful efforts of the National Association of Credit Men on
behalf of the local manager, the court sustained the referee's action
in rejecting the votes cast for him and approving those cast for
his opponent. While the mere solicitation of claims by a prior
assignee is not a disqualification, a presumption exists against the
propriety of his selection as trustee which was not rebutted. Con-
flicting interests might be centered in him, a position inconsistent
with a trustee's duties to the creditors generally, for he would
have to account to himself as to his previous dealings with the
property and he might be committed in favor of creditors with in-
valid or preferential claims.
In Re Scott" frankly shows the lawyer's attitude toward the
credit association. A single creditor attended the meeting through
its proxy, the collection manager of the Grand Rapids Credit
Men's Association, who named its secretary as trustee. The as-
sociation actively solicited claims for the admitted purpose of
voting them for one of its agents, taking over his fees. It owed
a special duty to certain creditors from whom it received addi-
tional fees, and such duties frequently conflicted with those of a
trustee. While not questioning the qualifications, character and
personal responsibility of the trustee-elect, the referee objected be-
cause as a matter of public policy the practice of the association
election was aided by these persons is sufficient to make his selection im-
proper but merely calls for close scrutiny).
16 "It rarely happens that some particular ones of the creditors do not take
the leading part in both suggesting the name of a proposed trustee and in
working to bring about his election. A trustee so elected is not disqualified
because he may be on terms of great intimacy with the creditors seeking his
appointment." I re Foley, 1 F. (2d) 568, 570 (D.. C., S. D. Cal., 1924).
I TfDonovan Report, supra n. 3, at 89.
IR50 F. (2d) 1035 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931). Cf. In re Clay, 192 Fed. 830
(C. C. A. 1st, 1912) (common-law assignee disapproved as trustee); In re
Continental Bldg. & Loan Assn., 232 Fed. 413 (D. C., N. D. Cal., 1915), aff'd,
232 F. 824 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916), aff'd, 232 F. 828 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916) (bank-
ing institution which was trustee of mortgages belonging to bankrupt corpor-
ation ineligible as trustee in bankruptcy). As to possible conflicts of interests
see Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533, 23 S. Ct. 710 (1902); May v. Hender-
son, 268 U. S. 111, 45 S. Ct. 456 (1924).
10 53 F. (2d) 89. (D. C., W. D. Mich., 1931).
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afected the proper functioning of the bankruptcy court. He was
sustained upon the grounds (1) that the appropriation of the
trustee's fees by the association removes a strong incentive to his
efficient administration; (2) that such solicitation is reprehen-
sible; (3) that there is a conflict of interests; and (4) that any
activities by one not a creditor beyond merely filing claims, such
as examining the bankrupt and participating in the trustee's elec-
tion, constitutes unlawful practice of law.'
Since neither courts nor referees are in agreement as to the
exact grounds for disqualifying a trustee, these decisions simply
represent an attack upon credit associations as such. The as-
sociations were concededly reputable and efficient, and their con-
tinued good reputation would depend upon impartial and ef-
fective conduct. Notwithstanding all possible objections to their
functioning in bankruptcy, bureaus approved by the National
Association of Credit Men have often won the confidence of all
creditors in the field of friendly adjustment despite their closer
relationship with the creditors who initiated the proceedings with
them. Delegating perfunctory duties to clerks and soliciting
proxies are common practices, which sometimes achieve desirable
results.
It, re Scott' suggests that the evils in bankruptcy administra-
tion should be met directly by reform measures rather than by
giving credit assoiiations, however efficient, an entering wedge.
But such attempts by credit associations should at least aid ma-
terially in focusing the attention of the legal profession upon
the problem. One reform, suggested by the Donovan report, is
the licensing of qualified trustees, especially in the larger centers,
one of whom would be appointed at the outset and could be dis-
placed only by the voluntary action of a substantial number of
creditors.' If trustees are to be business specialists, certainly the
' Services rendered by a board of trade in representing creditors in bank-
ruptcy proceedings and in matters of general assignments for the benefit of
creditors are legal services and violate the Penal Act against corporate practice
of law. Meisel & Co. v. National Jewelers Board of Trade, 90 Misc. 19, 152
N. Y. Supp. 913 (1915), aff'd, 173 App. Div. 889, 157 N. Y. Supp. 1133
(1916), 73 A. L. R. 1336 (1931).
Supra n. 19, at 93.
Trustees would only be licensed in the principal urban localities. At their
first meeting, a quorum of at least 25 per cent. in number being represented,
the creditors could elect a substitute trustee from among those licensed.
Licensed trustees might be individuals or corporations (as the Bankruptcy
Act, § 45, 11 U. S. C. A. § 73 (1926) already provides). The individuals
might be attorneys, business men, accountants as in England, or representatives
of trade or credit organizations. The corporations might be banking insti-
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past record of many associations should commend them for ap-
pointment to a list of eligibles. In fact one of the proposed amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Act would give the credit associations
just such recognition.'
-BERNARD SCLOVE.
CONsTITuTIONAL LAW - ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS - Dis-
PENSING POWER. - The power of a board of appeals to vary the
application of a zoning ordinance was recently upheld by the
Ohio Supreme Court as not involving an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative powers. The ordinance, as is usual, provided
for relaxation of the strict letter of any provision in case of prac-
tical difficulty or unnecessary hardship.' Defendant was refused
a permit to remodel his building to be used as a sanitarium, al-
though it was in existence before the ordinance was adopted. The
board of appeals ordered the granting of the permit, finding that
the building was of substantial, unique, and special construction,
and that the intended use would not cause annoyance to occupants
of adjoining buildings. No conforming use of the land would have
been remunerative. Plaintiff then obtained an injunction against
the issuance of the permit and the remodeling of the building
but the court of appeals reversed the decree and dismissed the
petition. No bill of exceptions was taken in the appellate court,
and no special findings made. Therefore, the Supreme Court in
affirming the court of appeals decision had only to pass on the
naked legal question of whether the ordinance was an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power. L. and M. Investment
Co. v. cutzer2
tutions or corporations organized to specialize in liquidation work, as in Canada.
The possibility of credit organizations favoring local creditors could be ren-
dered negligible by licensing associations of high repute and choosing the
individuals on the basis of integrity as well as ability. Donovan Report, supra
n. 3, at 13-14, 26-33, 125-6.
2A proposed amendment to § 45 of the Bankruptcy Act w6uld authorize
non-profit trade associations to act as trustees in bankruptcy.
Zoning Ordinance of the City of Cleveland, 1281-23(b):
"Where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the
way of carrying out the strict letter of the provisions of this subdivision,
the board of appeals shall have the power in a specific case to vary the
application of any such provision in harmony with the general purpose
and intent of the subdivision so that the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare may be secured and substantial justice done."
-180 N. E. 379 (Ohio 1932).
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